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Abstract
Today, most public service delivery mechanisms, such as hospitals, police and re departments,
rely exclusively on digital generation, storage and analysis of vital information. To protect critical
digital resources access control mechanisms are employed. The aim is to dene rules under which
authorized users can access resources required to perform organizational tasks. These rules or policies
dene constraints of time and space on digital resources. Natural or man-made disasters pose a unique
challenge, whereby, previously dened constraints may debilitate the ability of the organization to act
to its fullest capability. In this paper we propose to employ contextual parameters; specically, activity
context in the form of emergency warnings, to adapt access control policies according to a priori
conguration which allows maximum access to critical resources. We also propose an architecture
for the detection of crises in the form of activity context and incorporate it in the policy adaptation
framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters are characterized by oods, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.
Man-made disasters are characterized by wars, industrial accidents and more recently, acts of
terror. Management of disaster calls for emergency services such as re, police and health care
to provide services in excess of what they offer otherwise [1]. Similarly, services like banks,
insurance and trafc management, are expected to expand their capabilities and provide services
Purdue University, Electrical and Computer Engineering; West Lafayette, IN 47907. amsamuel@purdue.edu. Corresponding
Author
yPurdue University, Electrical and Computer Engineering; West Lafayette, IN 47907. ghafoor@purdue.edu.
zPurdue University, Department of Computer Science; West Lafayette, IN 47907. bertino@purdue.edu.
May 15, 2007 DRAFT2
in a crisis situation. However, these services rely heavily on on-line access to critical data ranging
from rescue coordinates to electronic health records [2]. The onset of crisis demands that the
operating envelope in terms of users, duration and place of work be enhanced. In this respect a
critical requirement is that data be made accessible to users that may be different from the users
who have access to those data under normal conditions.
In most organizations, access to digital resources, such as critical data, is controlled by
dening access control rules or policies [3], which dictate the conditions or constraints under
which authenticated users are granted access privileges. A crisis situation may require that
policies governing access under normal situations be quickly adapted to allow timely access
to information for crisis management. Detection of a crisis is thus at the heart of adapting
access control policies for handling an emergency situation. Government agencies, such as those
listed in Table I, warn citizens of the onset of a crisis. Effective and automatic detection and
use of such warnings for an organization's access control policy adaptation is the challenge we
address in this paper.
In this paper we address such challenge by investigating two key issues:
1) How to detect and comprehend the activity context in case of a crisis or emergency, in a
transparent, distributed and exible manner.
2) How to use activity context to adapt access control policies for continued access to critical
resources.
Adaptation of network policies has been addressed by a number of researchers, notable among
them are [4], who propose a high level language to formulate policies and adapt network resources
based on request parameters. However, in this work the policy itself does not adapt. XACML [5]
also takes into account context parameters in access control decisions; however the approach is
very generic and thus a lot has to be provided by the underlying application. Also XACML does
not support the notion of triggers. To the best of our knowledge, adaptation of access control
policies in a crisis situation, based on contextual parameters has not been addressed so far, which
is the focuses of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides insight into activity
context and outlines a categorization based on dependence of activity contextual parameters.
Section III describes the access control policy adaptation methodology for temporal and spatial
constraints as well as for changes in user authorizations and role hierarchy. Section IV describes
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an architecture for implementing access control policy adaptation, based on detection of cri-
sis from distributed sources of activity context. Finally, Section V concludes the paper with
comments about avenues of future research.
II. ACTIVITY CONTEXT FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT
According to [6], context, in the form of identity, time, location and activity is dened as
Any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. Activity context is
further dened as what is occurring in the situation. One of the major hindrances in developing
a generalized representation of activity context is the fact that it is sensitive to the domain
under consideration. For example, a list of activities in the health care environment may include
emergency surgery, major surgery, minor surgery, etc. As it may be noted here, this taxonomy is
unique to health care and has no relevance to the banking environment. While it is not our aim
to develop ontology of the activity context, however, in order to further our understanding of
the activity context, we dene ve types of activities based on their inter-dependence on other
contextual parameters as well as dependence on each other.
An activity contextual parameter consists of discrete states, each of which has specic meaning
in terms of the domain in question. These states form the parameter values of the activity
parameter. An example is the activity context parameter of Homeland Security Advisory System
(HSAS) [7] which has ve states, namely: Low Risk, Guarded Risk, Elevated Risk, High Risk
and Severe Risk. While reporting the value of HSAS, one the the above mentioned values will
instantiate the HSAS parameter.
Type I Activities are independent of other contextual parameters (time, location, identity), as
well as of other activities. Type I activities may have internal and non-obvious links to other
activities, but the parameter value does not dene any such links. Example of such activities
is HSAS, where a Guarded Risk value does not reveal any time, location or user dependence.
However, internally, DHS may arrive at a specic value based on other activity parameters not
revealed to the public.
Type II Activities depend on other activities for its parameter states. The activities on which
type II activities depend may be independent or may depend on other contextual parameters and
activities.
Type III Activities depend on time contextual parameter. With each state of this activity, time
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information is also presented. An example is FEMAs heat warning, which may be in-effect at
certain times of the day.
Type IV Activities depend on location contextual parameter. The relevant location information
is also passed along with its value. An example is the NWS Severe Thunderstorm warning, which
is relevant only if location information (county, city etc) is associated with it.
Type V Activities relate to a specic set of users only. Users not in this set are not affected
by type V activities. An example is the Nuclear Power Plant Emergency by FEMA. While this
emergency may prompt Radiation emergency by CDC for the larger community, it is relevant
to the users working at the power plant only.
Responsible Agency Activity Parameter Possible Values (not
exhaustive)
Signicance
Department of Home-
land Security (DHS)
Homeland Security Advisory System
(HSAS)
Low Risk, Guarded
Risk, Elevated Risk,
High Risk,Severe Risk
Threat level to pro-
tected resources
National Weather Ser-
vice (NWS)
Severe Thunderstorm Warning, Flash
Flood Warning, Flood Warning, Tor-
nado Watch, Severe Thunderstorm
Watch, Red Flag Warning, Snow Ad-
visory, High Surf Advisory, etc
Parameterization
of these alerts not
available. However
detailed advisories are
released
Weather warnings
closely linked to the
geographic location
context as well as time
Center for Disease
Control (CDC)
Bio-terrorism, Chemical, Mass
Trauma, Natural Disasters and Severe
Weather, Radiation, etc
Parameterization
of these alerts not
available. However
detailed advisories are
released
Closely linked to time
and location context
parameters
Federal Emergency
Management Agency
(FEMA)
Chemical, Dam Failure, Earthquake,
Fire or Wildre, Flood, Hazardous Ma-
terial, Heat, Hurricane, etc
Parameterization
of these alerts not
available. However
detailed advisories are
released
Closely linked to time
and location context
parameters
TABLE I
PROMINENT ACTIVITY CONTEXT PARAMETERS SIGNIFYING A PUBLIC CRISIS
It may be noted here that most real-life activities may be a combination of the above dened
ve activities. Take the example of Flash Flood Warning by NWS which includes location
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(county, city, etc) and time and may also depend on Severe Thunder storm and Gale warning.
In Table I, we list prominent activity context parameters released by government and public
entities to signify some form of disaster or crisis. Note that among the four quoted government
agencies, there is a signicant overlap of the type of alerts that they generate. As an example
CDC reports Radiation as one of the alert parameters, which according to FEMA may be covered
by Hazardous Material alert, Nuclear Power Plant Emergency and Terrorism alert. The same alert
may be abstracted by DHS in the form of a raised HSAS. Crisis Activity parameters generated
by multiple agencies provide users a unique method of ascertaining the correctness of these
alerts. Moreover those parameters often contain relevant data, such as data on space and time,
that combined, provide a rich set of context information. Such information can be used to drive
the adaptation of the access control policies.
III. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ADAPTATION FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Access control policies are typically designed by policy administrators for day-to-day opera-
tions of an organization. Those policies often include temporal and spatial context parameters,
so that access is allowed or denied depending on the values of these parameters when access is
required. However, in case of a crisis, protection requirements for critical information sources
shift in favor of more readily accessible information to authenticated users at possibly different
times and locations. Specically the temporal and spatial constraints need to be redened
for catering to the changed situation (see Figure 1(a)). It is important to notice that access
control policy adaptation may take place along different dimensions, and it is thus necessary to
understand which are the adaptation dimensions relevant for emergency management. Based on
the previous discussion we have a list of requirements for access control policy adaptation in a
crisis environment. Such requirements, listed below, represent the relevant adaptation dimensions
of our approach.
 Changes in temporal constraints in terms of the time of day at which a certain task can be
performed and the duration of the task.
 Changes in spatial constraints to allow users to access information in emergency locations,
in addition to the normal operating environments.
 Enforcement of enhanced or relaxed identication and authentication requirements of users
authorized to access digital resources.
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 Escalation and revocation of privileges.
A key issue for the development of an adaptive access control model, supporting the above
adaptation requirements, is the adoption of an access control model able to take context infor-
mation into account. The natural choice in this respect is the one represented by Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) model and its extensions. RBAC has emerged as a de-facto model
for specifying security requirements of large organizations. Its strength lies in the denition
of user roles more akin to the functional responsibilities of users in the organization and
abstracting object permissions as roles [8]. Roles can be organized into hierarchies. Through the
hierarchy mechanism one can easily organize the set of roles in different groups, and thus clearly
distinguish between roles to be used under normal situations and roles to be used in emergencies.
The Generalized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) incorporates a set of language constructs for the
specication of temporal constraints [9]. While temporal based access control models are well
suited for enforcing access control decisions with respect to non-mobile users, they are not
designed for handling mobility aspect of users employing mobile computing devices and moving
among secure and insecure locations. Generalized Spatio-Temporal RBAC (GST-RBAC) [10]
adds spatial sensitivity to GTRBAC and support for rich spatial constraints.
We now describe a context-aware policy adaptation methodology based on semantics outlined
in GST-RBAC. Each role in GST-RBAC has a state associated with it; the possible states are
enabled, active and disabled. The enabled state indicates that the role can be activated by a
user. The active state indicates that the role has been activated by the user. The disabled state
indicates that the role cannot be used in any user session. A prominent feature of GST-RBAC
is the denition of temporal as well as rich spatial constraints which dene the time-based and
location-based conditions under which a role can be enabled, activated and disabled. Another
interesting feature of the model is the notion of enabled and disabled constraints. A constraint
may be enabled for a duration or at a location, as a consequence of a run-time events or triggers.
We use this feature to adapt constraints in an access control policy in case of a crisis.
A. Adaptation of Constraints
The constraint adaptation strategy is the rst crucial element of our adaptation approach, which
is based on the use of GST-RBAC. To this end, we introduce a categorization of constraints, both
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temporal as well as spatial, into Normal Constraints (NC) and Crisis Constraints (CC).
Normal Constraints (NC) are constraints, both temporal and spatial, dened for day-to-day
operations of the organization. NCs are enabled in the policy by default, and are applied to all
requests being generated by users under normal circumstances.
Crisis Constraints (CC) are constraints specically dened for the operation of the organi-
zation in case of a crisis. CCs include temporal and spatial constraints specically related to a
crisis such as working round the clock from makeshift locations. By default the CCs are disabled
under normal circumstances and are enabled during a crisis.
The access control policies are composed by policy administrators of the organization. De-
nition of NCs and CCs is a crucial part of this exercise and is carried out in conjunction with
the crisis managers and emergency responders.
Activity context parameters are used to enable CCs and disable NCs at runtime with the help
of events/triggers. As discussed in Section II, various types of activity context depend on time,
location and other activity context parameters. In this regard, Type III activity event will enable
temporal constraints which may be part of CCs and will have no effects on spatial constraints
part of CCs. Also, Type III activity events will disable temporal constraints part of NCs and will
have no effect on spatial constraints in NCs.
Type IV events will disable spatial constraints part of NCs and will enable spatial constraints
of NCs. Further, Type IV will also enable spatial constraints part of CCs and will disable spatial
constraints of CCs.
B. Adaptation of User Authorization
In order to effectively cater for Type V activity (activities dependent on users), we introduce
two classes of users, namely: Weakly Enforced Users (WEU) and Strongly Enforced Users
(SEU).
The Weakly Enforced Users (WEU) are users who may be in the eld and may not require
authentication in the event of a crisis. The WEUs may access data, for viewing or update,
which may not be critical in nature and/or may not effect the integrity of the over all crisis
management process. The need for introducing such user category is based on the recognition
that in an emergency situation it may not be always possible to authenticate users who are in
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Fig. 1. (a)Adaptation of access control policy in a crisis. Access control policy P is the composed policy containing both
directives for use during normal circumstances, as well as those for use in a crisis. P' is the instance of the policy for normal
circumstances, and P is the instance for use in an emergency.(b) Privilege escalation in a crisis; privilege envelope of policy
instance P' is escalated to privilege envelope of policy instance P.
the eld. In such cases, it may be necessary to trade off strong assurance for data condentiality
and privacy with the need to make those data readily available.
Strongly Enforced Users (SEU) are users who may be responsible for critical information
access or actions. These personnel could be in the role of a manager or head of surgery
etc, and the system may demand them to possess credentials (in terms of user IDs etc) for
authentication even in the case of a crisis. Strong authentication is required to protect against
attackers attempting to compromise the crisis process management by falsifying information and
accessing information sensitive for the crisis management.
The assignment and enabling of WEUs and SEUs in the access control policy is based on
Type V activity context in the form of an event or a trigger. It also requires a careful assessment
of which resources are highly critical for the crisis management process.
C. Adaptation of Role Hierarchies for Privilege Escalation
RBAC offers role hierarchy as a means for roles to inherit permissions and users from each
other. Role r1 inherits role r2 (expressed as r1  r2 )if all permissions of r2 are also permissions
of r1. In this case r1 acquires all users of r2. Clearly, dening a hierarchy between roles affords
a means of transferring privileges from one role to the other, a feature we use to adapt privileges
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in case of a crisis. By dening role hierarchy which is valid only in a crisis, privileges of a
role can be handed over to other roles so as to allow maximum number of users the ability to
perform certain tasks. Similarly, disabling role hierarchy can also be used to disable subordinate
roles. GST-RBAC allows roles to be enabled and disabled as a result of a runtime trigger or
event. In the case of a crisis, adapting role hierarchy can take one of the following three forms.
Note that the runtime trigger or event in each case is the activity context. The type of activity
context will dictate the manner in which it will affect a particular case.
1) Enabling or disabling a role hierarchy in a crisis, results in all subordinate roles (in the
hierarchy) to be enabled or disabled, respectively. This mechanism allows escalation or
revocation of privileges in a crisis. This can be useful in the case of an unrestricted (both
temporally and spatially) role hierarchy. Enabling/disabling of roles based on runtime time
triggers and events has been formalized in [9].
2) Adaptation of time based role hierarchy allows roles to inherit privileges at a different time
of the day, not allowed previously, and for longer (or shorter) duration. Since the enable
time and activation time role hierarchies [9] are driven by the respective temporal
constraints, their adaptation is achieved by the enabling and disabling the relevant temporal
constraints as dened in Section III-A.
3) Adaptation of spatial role hierarchy allows roles to inherit privileges at locations not
previously allowed. Enabling/disabling simple spatially restricted and topologically
related role hierarchy [10] is achieved by the spatial constraint adaptation methodology
described in Section III-A.
D. Privilege Escalation and Revocation for Crisis Management
Adapting access control policy in the event of a crisis allows users to perform their tasks at
times and places dened specically for such an eventuality. The operating envelope of the two
instances of policy P, before adaptation (P') and after adaptation (P) is depicted in Figure 1(b).
Note that in case of a crisis, authorized users are granted privileges in addition to the ones
held by them prior to the declaration of a crisis. For example a physician authorized to work
in a hospital from 9 AM to 5 PM in normal circumstances may now be authorized to work for
24 hours, without a break. Similar is the case of location, where a nurse may be authorized to
access records of a patient while at the nursing station only; however, in case of an emergency,
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the nurse may be allowed to access the same records throughout the out-patient wing of the
hospital. Figure 1(b) depicts the privilege envelope expanding in case of a crisis, compared to
the smaller one before a crisis.
It is however important to notice that, in the event of a crisis, privileges may also be revoked.
A case in point is that of non-essential personnel in a hospital who may not be allowed to
work in a crisis so that system load can be reduced. An example is that of a grad student from
a neighboring university working on her PhD dissertation by conducting statistical analysis of
hospital data to pin point a trend in number of patients committing suicide after consulting a
specic physician. While such analysis is not useful in the event of a crisis, it may take up
precious system resources.
Using the above mentioned privilege escalation and revocation techniques for GST-RBAC,
privileges can be effectively escalated and revoked based on the activity context. The use of events
and triggers together with constraints and role hierarchies provide the necessary mechanism to
achieve the desirable escalation and revocation of privileges in a crisis.
IV. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ADAPTATION DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the system architecture implementing the proposed access control
policy adaptation. In particular, we apply the adaptation methodology developed in the preceding
sections to a crisis situation in an organization. Although the architecture has been developed
with RBAC model in mind, it is general enough to be applied to any context aware access
control model.
The architecture is depicted in Figure 2. We now highlight the functionality of key components
by describing two scenarios; one with a request under normal circumstances and the other with
a request in a crisis situation.
A. Access Control Under Normal Circumstances
The access control policy is composed and stored in the Access Control Policy Base. In
addition to other components of the policy (as mentioned in [9], [10]), temporal and spatial
constraints, classied as NCs and CCs are also stored. The Policy Instance Generator creates
an instance of the policy with the NC constraints.
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Fig. 2. Access control policy adaptation architecture in a crisis.
Requests from the users in the form of the objects to be accessed, time of request and location
of request, reach the Access Control Decision module (ACDM), depicted as label 1 in Figure 2.
The decision concerning whether to grant the access is made by the ACDM in conjunction with
the Policy Instance Manager (PIM) which stores the current instance of the policy. The requested
object is retrieved from the Database Objects and sent to the user (depicted as label 3 in 2).
B. Access Control for Crisis Management
In order to detect a crisis, the Activity Query Interface (AQI) queries the distributed sources of
activity context (label 1' in Figure 2). Querying can be based on polling, or AQI can be designed
as a passive component waiting for the sources to send out activity context parameters. Either
way, the activity context is sent out by the sources (label 2' in Figure 2) and AQI forwards it
to the Activity Evaluator and Extractor (AEE). The AEE separates the various types of activity
context (as dened in Section II). Note that the types of activity context denes the type of
constraint it will affect. As an example, Type III activity context is related to time, and will
affect the temporal constraints in the access control policy. AEE is also responsible to correlate
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similar contextual parameters received from multiple sources. An example in this case would
be the case of NWS providing thunderstorm warning in a particular area along with FEMA
releasing a similar alert. In the rare occasion of a mismatch between alerts sent out by different
agencies, AEE makes a selection based on predetermined priorities by the policy administrators.
The individual activity context parameter (along with its type) is sent to PIM (label 4' in
Figure 2). PIM requests a different policy instance based on the value of the activity context
and the CCs in the policy (label 5' in Figure 2). The Policy Instance Generator generates the
new instance and loads it in the ACDM (label 6' in Figure 2).
A new request generated by the user (label 7' in Figure 2) is received by the ACDM which
grants privileges to the user under a different policy instance. The changed privileges allow the
user to access database objects (label 8' in Figure 2) which could not be access under normal
circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive approach to access control policy adaptation
in a crisis situation. The basis of this adaptation is the ability of the access control mechanism
to sense crisis and follow a well dened methodology for adaptation. Specically, we cate-
gorize activity context parameters based on their dependence on other contextual parameters
and activities. Our proposed policy adaptation methodology describes a step-wise approach to
adapting temporal and spatial constraints, user identities and role hierarchy. We also propose an
architecture for implementing the adaptation methodology.
A number of issues remain to be addressed. The issue of policy verication during and after
adaptation needs to be addressed and a comprehensive verication for the original policy as well
as for the adapted policy needs to be devised. The proposed architecture is based on the use
of an alert system provided by government agencies, which at present mostly consists of RSS
(Really Simple Syndication) [11] feeds. A more machine readable format is required for systems
to autonomously query activity context relevant to a crisis using technologies such as Service
Oriented Architecture [12].
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